The following fragment is a less known yet very profound writing by the famous 18th century philosopher David Hume concerning the vast amount of evil and suffering in the world and how it is related to the subject of Theism.
The fourth objection is not leveled against the intelligence of the deity, but against his moral attributes, which are equally essential to the system of theism.
The attempt to prove the moral attributes from the natural benevolence from intelligence, must appear vain, when we consider that these qualities are totally distinct and separate. Reason and virtue are not the same; nor do they appear to have any immediate connection, in the nature of things.
Even in man, any degree of the one affords no presumption for an equal degree of the other. A sound understanding and a hard heart are very compatible. Allowing, therefore, the intelligence of the deity to be proved by phenomena, ever so clear and decisive; we can draw no inference concerning his benevolence, without a new set of phenomena, equally clear and decisive.
Whether the author of nature be benevolent or not can only be proved by the effects, and by the predominancy either of good or evil, of happiness or misery, in the universe. If good prevail much above evil, we may, perhaps, presume, that the author of the universe, if an intelligent, is also a benevolent principle. If evil prevail much above good, we may draw a contrary inference. This is a standard, by which we may decide such a question, with some appearance of certainty; but when the question is brought to that standard, and we would willingly determine the facts, upon which we must proceed in our reasoning; we find that it is very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, ever to ascertain them. For who is able to form an exact computation of all the happiness and misery, that are in the world, and to compare them exactly with each other? I know it is the common opinion, that evil prevails very much above good, even amongst mankind, who are the most favoured by nature of all sensible creatures: But still some think, they have reason to dispute this popular opinion. What one may safely pronounce on this head, is, that if we compare pains and pleasures in their degrees, the former are infinitely superior;
there being many pains, and even durable ones, extremely acute; and no pleasure, that is at the same time very intense and very durable. Love betwixt the sexes is, I believe, the only one, that has any pretensions to the character of an exquisite and intense pleasure, whether we consider the bodily enjoyment which it affords, or the tenderness and elegance of that friendship, which it inspires. Perhaps men of strong genius may find as high pleasures in study and contemplation. But what is all this in comparison of those many cruel distempers and violent sorrows, to which human life is subject? In this view, therefore, pains and pleasures are not to be put into the balance with each other. On the other hand, if we compare the frequency of pains with that of pleasures, we shall find, that the latter have the advantage, and that small pleasures, to the greatest part of mankind, return oftener, than pain or uneasiness. When a man is in good health and in good humour, every common incident of life affords him satisfaction; to go to bed; to rise again; to eat; to drink; to converse; to enjoy the weather;
to perform his business; to hear news; to retail them. These incidents compose the lives of most men; and these are not without enjoyment. But whether those pleasures, by their frequency, are able to compensate the acuteness of our pains, I must confess I am not able to determine with any certainty. When I consider the subject with the utmost impartiality, and take the most comprehensive view of it, I find myself more inclined to think, that evil predominates in the world, and am apt to regard human life as a scene of misery, according to the sentiments of the greatest sages as well as of the generality of mankind, from the beginning of the world to his day. I am sensible, however, that there are many circumstances, which are apt to pervert my judgement in this particular, and make me entertain melancholy views of things. What is evil alarms us more, and makes more lasting impression than what is agreeable; which we readily receive without enquiry, and which we think ourselves in some measure, entitled to. Besides, the greater intenseness of our pains has a much more powerful influence on the imagination than the frequency of our pleasures;
and it is almost impossible for us to make a just compensation betwixt them. Should I enumerate all the evils, incident to human life, and display them, with eloquence, in their proper colours, I should certainly gain the cause with most readers, who would be apt to despise, as frivolous, all the pleasures, which could be placed in opposition to them. Victuals, wine, a fiddle, a warm bed, a coffee-house conversation make a pitiful figure, when compared with racks, gravels, infamy, solitude, and dungeons. But I take no advantage of this circumstance, and shall not employ any rhetoric in a philosophical argument, where reason alone ought to be hearkened to. I shall only infer, from the whole, that the facts are here so complicated and dispersed, that a certain conclusion can never be formed from them, and that no single convert will ever be made by any disputes upon this subject; but each disputant will still go off the field with a stronger confirmation of those opinions and prejudices, which he brought to it. Did a controversy arise whether more males or females are born; could this question ever be decided merely by our running over all the families of our acquaintance; without the assistance of any bills of mortality, which bring the matter to a certainty?
But though it be difficult to decide this question, whether there be more good or evil in the universe, we may, perhaps, find means, independent of it, to decide, in some tolerable manner, that other question concerning the benevolence of the deity. Were evil predominant in the world, there would evidently remain no proofs of benevolence in the supreme being.
But even if good be predominate; since it prevails in so small a degree, and is counter balanced by so many ills; it can never afford any proof of that attribute. Pains and pleasures seem to be scattered indifferently through life, as heat and cold, moist and dry are dispersed through the universe; and if the one prevails a little above the other, this is what will naturally happen in any mixture of principles, where an exact equality is not expressly intended. On every occasion, nature seems to employ either.
The source of the fragment:
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion And Other Writings by Dorothy Coleman (z-lib.org).pdf (1.3 مگابایت)